TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/091090/0910016.000

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                ╞G                                                            THE GULF, Page 20

COVER STORIES

Pausing at the Rim of the Abyss


Suddenly it's time to talk. But while both sides seem to be
looking for an exit, neither is ready to give way on its basic
demands.

By LISA BEYER -- Reported by Dean Fischer/Cairo, Dan Goodgame/
Kennebunkport and J.F.O. McAllister/Washington


    Having marched headlong to the precipice of war, both sides
in the Persian Gulf conflict peered into the abyss last week
and took a deep breath. From all the signs, each party wanted
to inch back from the brink.

    There was suddenly an enormous amount of talking -- peace
talk, settlement talk, negotiation talk -- but most of it was
just that, talk. Saddam Hussein, looking a little sweatier,
issued a flurry of offers to negotiate, but his antics seemed
intended mainly to avert a military showdown. A clutch of
mediators led by U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
set off on peacemaking missions, yet none carried much promise
of success. In Washington, President Bush toned down his
rhetoric and turned his attention to diplomacy, but said bluntly
that he had no immediate hope for "fruitful negotiations."
Despite a gut sense that both sides might be looking for a
peaceful exit from the crisis, neither seemed prepared to give
way on its basic -- and irreconcilable -- demands. "It's a
cat-and-mouse game," said British Foreign Secretary Douglas
Hurd in a remark about Saddam's treatment of the hostages. "Now
a little mercy, now some more ruthlessness."

    For the moment, an uneasy equilibrium was reached. By most
accounts, the U.S. had pumped sufficient firepower into Saudi
Arabia to deter an Iraqi attack but not enough to retake Kuwait
by force. The interim was giving both sides time to work out
just what they were willing to fight or settle for. For the
U.S., the choice was between defusing the immediate crisis --
either by waiting for the sanctions to work or by accepting
some kind of a settlement -- or getting rid of the menace in
Baghdad once and for all. For Saddam, the question was whether
to retreat now with some face-saving concession and live to
fight another day, or to stand his ground in Kuwait at the risk
of military confrontation.

    While pondering their options, both were probing to see if
there was any give on the other side. Saddam Hussein continued
to play on public opinion, trying to break open the alliance
arrayed against him. He used television regularly to say he
welcomed peace talks without preconditions, while his
government quietly proposed slightly more reasonable settlement
offers. He promised to release the women and children among
Iraq's foreign hostages -- at week's end hundreds of them were
ferried out of the country -- and said he would let the men go
too, if only the U.S. would swear not to attack Iraq. To avoid
a shootout on the seas, Saddam instructed his ships to submit
to searches by Western vessels enforcing the U.N. economic
sanctions.

    But it seemed more public relations than reality, a way of
buying time while he tested the staying power and cohesion of
his enemies. In the process, Saddam aimed to consolidate his
own position. "He hopes that after a while everyone will get
used to Kuwait's being under Iraqi control," said an Iraq
expert who advises the U.S. military on Saddam. Yet with the
kind of schizophrenia that seems to characterize many of his
moves, Saddam's cruel dallying over the hostages not only
dissipated any goodwill his promise was intended to earn but
made his opponents even angrier.

    For its part, the Bush Administration realized it could not
cede all the peace talk to Saddam. The U.S. had to be seen to
be looking for negotiated solutions even while standing ready
to employ force. To achieve an Iraqi withdrawal, President Bush
allowed last week, "you have to talk." Concerned by Soviet
complaints that the U.S. has given diplomacy short shrift, the
White House announced on Saturday that Bush will head to
Helsinki this Sunday to discuss the gulf situation, among other
things, with President Mikhail Gorbachev.

    All over the region, volunteer statesmen shuttled across
borders talking up peace. Jordan's King Hussein flew to Libya,
Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and then on to Europe to little
avail. Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat
pushed his unrealistic plan for a settlement in talks with
French Prime Minister Michel Rocard. Even Jesse Jackson
traveled to Baghdad, ostensibly as a TV journalist, though he
did help make arrangements for the departure of several
hostages.

    With all that goodwill in the air and with the news that
OPEC had freed its members to make up for lost Iraqi and
Kuwaiti oil, world financial markets recovered slightly from
the previous week's nose dive. The respite helped generally to
ease tensions and shore up international solidarity. "You can
feel it around here," said an army colonel at the Pentagon.
"The pace continues, but the anxiety has abated."

    The glimmers of peace were probably just a mirage. Neither
the U.S. nor Iraq was reversing course. America and its allies
continued to insist on nothing less than Iraq's unconditional
withdrawal from Kuwait, but no one expected Saddam to agree to
that now. What concessions the Iraqi leader did offer were
widely dismissed as p.r. ploys calculated to fracture the broad
alliance of nations ranged against him. "I hope we will come
out of the war mind-set," said French President Francois
Mitterrand, "but I have not seen obvious signs over the past
few days of an improvement in the situation."

    Even as Perez de Cuellar huddled in Jordan with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the consensus among Western powers
was that there simply was nothing to negotiate. The U.N. chief
emphasized that he did not plan to bargain with Baghdad but
would try to persuade the renegade state to abide by the
Security Council's demand for a pullout from Kuwait, the
restoration of the deposed Emir and the release of all
hostages. When his sessions with Aziz ended, Perez de Cuellar
announced "disappointment" at the result.

    Yet some were beginning to wonder if the Iraqis were growing
more pliable. The U.S. military buildup was unrelenting. The
economic sanctions were beginning to pinch: breadlines were
long in Baghdad last week, prompting Saddam to ration food and
send envoys around the globe in search of new supplies. Said
Perez de Cuellar: "I have seen some indications that Iraq would
like to find a way out."

    The clearest signals came in the form of half a dozen trial
balloons floated by Iraq to Washington through back-door
intermediaries. Saddam has publicly denied supporting any of
these initiatives, though Bush Administration officials have
confirmed that at least some of them came from Iraq's Foreign
Ministry. The most recent feelers added up to an offer of
withdrawal from Kuwait and release of all foreign nationals in
return for several concessions: federation or some other close
association between Kuwait and Iraq; guaranteed Iraqi access to
the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, which block most of
Iraq's scant 18 miles of Persian Gulf shoreline; and
settlement of Iraq's claims regarding pumping rights in the
Rumaila oil field, which lies mostly in Iraq but dips slightly
into Kuwait.

    The U.S. would grant none of these as preconditions to a
pullout. The last two items, officials admitted, could be
negotiated between Iraq and Kuwait after a withdrawal is
complete. "Then the two countries can reach any agreement they
want," said an Administration source. But any formal
Iraq-Kuwait link is out of the question for Bush's camp. "That
demand tells us that Saddam Hussein still doesn't get it," said
a senior White House official. "We haven't yet convinced him
that he can't hang on to Kuwait, not even indirectly." It was
notable, however, that Baghdad's offers were growing
progressively less objectionable.

    The positive aspects of Iraq's latest peace plans, however,
were undercut by other bellicose actions. Saddam formally
designated the oil-rich land of Kuwait the 19th province of
Iraq. Although Baghdad promised that the estimated 11,000 women
and children among its 21,000 Western hostages would be free
to leave last Wednesday, most of those who chose to depart were
delayed by red tape. On Friday 19 Italians managed to depart,
and the next day several hundred other foreigners were flown
out.

    On the military front, there was no retreat. According to
the Pentagon, Iraq last week reinforced its troops in and
around Kuwait to 265,000. These moves were probably defensive;
virtually no American official believes Iraq will push farther
south now that the Saudis are backed by 50,000 American troops
and the muscular arms of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. Still,
Baghdad asserted that if war broke out, it would attack not
only Saudi Arabia but Israel too. That would provoke a roaring
conflagration in the region, with the Israelis and their
American allies retaliating in force but with the other Arab
states lining up behind Baghdad.

    By sending out such contradictory messages, Saddam must
reckon that some of his opponents might be more willing to
accept peace on his terms than others would be. And as the
crisis moves into a period of stalemate, Washington faces real
difficulties holding the united front together. For the first
time, Moscow openly criticized the American military effort in
the gulf. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Belonogov disavowed
the U.S. decision to send in troops and questioned whether they
would ever leave the area.

    The Arab states are an even weaker link in the chain. They
keep talking about an "Arab solution" to the crisis, the talk
emanating mainly from the factions most sympathetic to Saddam,
such as Jordan, the P.L.O. and some of the countries of the
Maghreb. While no actual plan exists, the idea generally
includes a withdrawal of all non-Arab forces, some kind of
face-saving concessions for Saddam and an overarching
settlement of the two other flash points in the region --
Lebanon and the Palestinian problem.

    But last week's Arab League summit in Cairo merely
underscored the sharp division in the Arab world. The only
members who turned up, except for Libya, were the 12 who had
voted three weeks earlier to condemn Iraq's invasion and send
Arab troops to help defend Saudi Arabia. So far the Arab
governments allied against Iraq are holding firm, but Saddam
is shrewdly working to undercut their positions with his talk
of negotiation and by exploiting grass-roots resentment toward
the American presence.

    In a counterparry, Washington worked to bind the anti-Iraq
coalition more tightly. To spread the responsibility for
subduing Baghdad more evenly and ensure that the Arab allies
are not squeezed dry by the trade embargo, the Bush
Administration proposed last week that its richer friends
contribute to an expense fund. With the shape of the entire
post-cold war world at stake, said Bush, countries like Japan,
West Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and South
Korea should help with $1 billion a month to defray much of the
$1.4 billion  monthly costs of the U.S. deployment. They should
pony up $10 billion more to reimburse Jordan, Egypt and Turkey
for losses caused by the ban on Iraqi trade. The fund was also
designed to ensure the continued support of the U.S. Congress,
likely to grow restive at footing the bill alone while facing
a mushrooming federal deficit. Though overwhelmingly supportive
of the President's actions, lawmakers who met with him last
week made burden sharing a top priority.

    Washington also began a broad effort to build up Saudi
Arabia's arsenal so that it can defend itself better. The
Administration agreed to sell Riyadh $2.2 billion in
sophisticated new armaments, including 12 F-15s, 150 M-60A3
tanks and 200 Stinger surface-to-air missiles. The Israelis,
fearful that the Saudis might one day turn that might against
them, were alarmed by the new commitments. Of course, they are
asking for more weapons and military aid themselves. The Bush
Administration appeared receptive. Washington was also
considering forgiving all or part of Egypt's $7.1 billion
military debt to the U.S.

    Worries about the staying power of the international
coalition in part accounted for the resolution last week of a
raging debate within the Bush Administration over how far to
go in putting Saddam down. One school, led by Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney, argued that even if Kuwait were liberated, Saddam
should not be allowed to remain in power in Iraq with his
million-man army, his chemical weapons and a nuclear potential
intact. Unless disarmed completely, he could intimidate his
neighbors at will, and he would be able to launch an even more
aggressive challenge to the global order next time.

    The Israelis staunchly backed Cheney's view that it is wiser
to dispose of Saddam now than face graver peril doing so later.
But the opposing camp, led by National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft, won out with its admonition against expanding U.S.
war aims beyond restoration of the status quo ante. Scowcroft
feared that the U.S. might not be able to sustain domestic and
international support long enough to remove Saddam from power,
which would probably require military action. "Nobody in the
world was willing to go to war for that objective before the
invasion of Kuwait," said one senior official, "and it is not
clear why we should remain at war for those objectives after we
reverse the effects of the invasion."

    To prevent Saddam from turning right around and molesting
his neighbors again, the Bush Administration will suggest that
any Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait be followed by the
establishment of a multi-national force, preferably made up
mainly of Arab troops, to act as a trip wire. There is also
much talk of maintaining a permanent U.S. presence in Saudi
Arabia to keep Iraq honest, but most analysts outside the
Administration doubt the Arabs would tolerate that for long.
Said Bush: "I think the world would demand that there be no
chance of another invasion the minute this ended." The problem
is how to get Saddam to agree.

    The so-called pragmatists around Bush convinced him that a
U.S. drive to oust Saddam and weaken his military might bring
a host of nasty repercussions, including seething Arab
resentment against the U.S. "imperialists" and their ruling
Arab cohorts, a radical Shi`ite takeover of Iraq and the
weakening of Iraq as a military counter to Iran and Syria. The
pragmatists added a kicker -- probably wishful: just forcing
Saddam out of Kuwait would humiliate him so badly that it might
lead to his overthrow. Said Bush last week: "It wouldn't
disappoint me if the Iraqis got up and said, `Look, this man
is our problem.'" But he stopped short of setting that down as
an American objective.

    This scenario must be very much on Saddam's mind too, a fact
that argues against his giving up his new 19th province without
a fight. For the moment Saddam appears to be calculating that
the danger he faces from his population as food supplies run
low is not yet as great as the perils he would face from his
generals should he pull out of Kuwait with nothing to show for
it.

    While all the talk last week felt good, none of it looked
very promising. The U.S. and its allies still need to reach a
broad consensus on just what their goals are and which ones
they are willing to fight for. Few Americans believe oil is
worth a war. The Bush Administration has apparently decided
that evicting Saddam from Kuwait is sufficient, and that
certainly leaves open the possibility of an outcome short of
war. Everyone fears the consequences of demanding more. Yet the
West must ask itself if Saddam's withdrawal will be enough to
bring real and permanent peace to the gulf.